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NOTES
PA YNE V. TENNESSEE: REJECTION OF
PRECEDENT, RECOGNITION OF VICTIM
IMPACT WORTH
The United States constitutional system imparts upon the states the re-
sponsibility for delineating those crimes which contravene state law, devel-
oping practices and procedures for the trial of such crimes, and establishing
appropriate punishments for their commission.' Those state laws which reg-
ulate criminal acts and impose responsive penalties are subordinate to the
overriding provisions of the United States Constitution.' The United States
Supreme Court has held that where a state imposes the death penalty for a
particular crime, the threshold requirements of the Eighth Amendment3
must still be met before the death penalty may be imposed.4 Beyond those
1. Payne v. Tennessee, II1 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1991); accord Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 168 (1952).
2. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2607; accord Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168.
3. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII. The prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment are directly applicable to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666 (1962).
4. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987). Those requirements include
the establishment of rational criteria that guide the sentencing authority in judging whether
the circumstances of the case meet the minimum findings necessary to impose the death pen-
alty. In addition, the sentencing authority must consider relevant information offered by a
defendant, and a state may not restrict the sentencing authority's ability to consider relevant
circumstances that could cause it to decline to impose the death penalty. Id. Specifically, a
jury must make an "individualized determination" as to whether the defendant ought to be
executed based upon "the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime."
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
304 (1976) (holding that the Eighth Amendment requires the "consideration of the character
and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense").
This Note takes no position on the relative merits, inadequacies or moral controversies sur-
rounding the imposition of the death penalty. As noted by the plurality opinion of Justices
Stewart, Powell and Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia, "[d]espite the continuing debate... over the
morality and utility of capital punishment, it is now evident that a large proportion of Ameri-
can society continues to regard it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction." Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
At least thirty-five states have enacted statutes providing for the death penalty under certain
circumstances. Id. at 179-80 n.23.
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requirements, however, the Court will defer to the states and allow them to
develop new and alternative practices, procedures, and devices relevant to
the death penalty punishment in capital cases.5 One such practice, the use of
victim impact information, has been adopted by state legislatures 6 and uti-
lized by prosecutors' to inform the sentencing authority in capital cases
about the harm resulting from a particular crime.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of victim impact information
in the 1987 case of Booth v. Maryland.' In Booth, the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment absolutely prohibited a jury from considering victim im-
pact statements in capital sentencing proceedings. 9 The Court reasoned that
such evidence was irrelevant to the defendant's blameworthiness, thereby
creating an impermissible risk that the decision to impose the death penalty
would be an arbitrary one based upon factors of which the defendant was
not aware.'° While holding that victim impact statements were per se inad-
missible during sentencing, the Court failed to specify whether other types of
victim-related information were admissible. The Court explained that its
holding would not render such information irrelevant if it related directly to
the circumstances of the crime."
Two years later, in South Carolina v. Gathers,2 the Court was faced with
statements made by the prosecutor, rather than by the victim's survivors,
which characterized the victim's personal qualities.' The Court found the
statements to be indistinguishable from those presented in Booth, and con-
cluded that allowing the jury to impose a death sentence upon such a basis
would be inequitable since the defendant was unaware of the personal attrib-
utes of the victim when he made his decision to kill.' 4 Thus, the Gathers
5. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1000-01 (1983). "Within the constitutional
limitations defined by [case law], the States enjoy their traditional latitude to prescribe the
method by which those who commit murder shall be punished." Blystone v. Pennsylvania,
494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 498-99 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Ten-
nessee, I l I S. Ct. 2597 (1991); infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2603; infra text accompanying notes 24-26; see also
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 808-10 (1989), overruled by Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2597;
infra text accompanying notes 112-13.
8. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
9. Id. at 509. A victim impact statement describes the crime's effect upon the victim or
the victim's family, and is often contained in a presentence investigation report. See id. at 498-
99. It is read into the record during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1567 (6th ed. 1990).
10. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-05; see discussion infra part II.A.
11. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10.
12. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
13. Id. at 811; see discussion infra part II.B.
14. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
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Court extended Booth to preclude prosecutorial comment regarding a vic-
tim's personal characteristics. I"
Both Booth and Gathers were narrow majority decisions involving highly
critical dissents,16 and both evoked widespread criticism across the country
from victims' rights groups assailing the exclusion of victim information in
the sentencing process."7 Partially in response to these concerns, manifested
by federal and state legislation on the subject,"8 and in part reflecting the
change in the personnel on the Supreme Court, 9 the Court agreed to recon-
sider the issue of victim impact information in Payne v. Tennessee.2°
In Payne, the defendant stabbed a woman and her two-year-old daughter
to death, and critically wounded the woman's three-year-old son.2 Pervis
Tyrone Payne was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court on two
counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit
15. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2604 (1991).
16. See id. at 2611 (noting that Booth and Gathers were "decided by the narrowest of
margins, over spirited dissents").
17. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
18. In recent years, Congress and a majority of the states have passed legislation allowing
the sentencing body to take into account the ramifications of the harm caused by the defend-
ant's criminal acts. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606.
19. See id. at 2622 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (claiming all that has changed since Booth
and Gathers were decided is the Court's personnel). Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens formed the majority in Booth; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Scalia, and O'Connor dissented. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 497 (1987). In
Gathers, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and White constituted the majority,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy dissented. South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). Justice Powell's replacement, Justice Kennedy,
voted in favor of overruling Booth, but Justice White voted to reaffirm the precedent. David 0.
Stewart, Four Spirited Dissenters, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 40. Prior to the decision in Payne,
Justice Brennan, a noted liberal of the Court, was succeeded by Justice Souter, who helped give
the Court a solid conservative majority. Dawn Ceol, Souter's Ideas Give Session Solidly Con-
servative Slant, WASH. TiMEs, July 1, 1991, at A10. As a result, the Booth and Gathers dis-
senters became the majority in Payne: Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White,
Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in overruling the Booth and Gathers decisions. Payne,
111 S. Ct. at 2601. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens became the dissenters in Payne.
Id.
20. 111 S. Ct. 1031 (1991). The Court had agreed to hear another case, Ohio v. Huertas,
earlier in the term to address the continued viability of Booth and Gathers, but the case was
dismissed following oral argument when the Justices determined that certiorari had been im-
providently granted. See State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39
(1990), cert. dismissed, I11 S. Ct. 805 (1991).
21. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2601-02. Charisse Christopher, a divorced mother, was alone
with her two children, Lacie, age two, and Nicholas, age three, when Pervis Tyrone Payne
entered their Millington, Tennessee, apartment. When Charisse resisted Payne's sexual ad-
vances, he became violent. Neighbors heard "blood curdling" screams and called the police.
Upon their arrival, the police discovered Charisse and her children lying on the kitchen floor
in pools of blood. Charisse and Lacie were both found dead, having sustained multiple knife
wounds. Nicholas survived, despite several knife wounds completely penetrating his body. Id.
19921
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murder, based upon overwhelming and relatively uncontroverted evidence.22
During the penalty phase of the trial, four witnesses testified on the defend-
ant's behalf as to his good character.23 For the State, the mother of the slain
woman testified about the traumatic effect of the murders upon the woman's
surviving son, Nicholas, stating that he cried for his mother and sister and
did not understand why they did not come home.24 The prosecutor, in his
closing argument, reminded the jury that when Nicholas grew up he would
want to know that justice had been done.25 He further argued that Nicholas
would never again have his little sister to play with or his mother to sing him
a lullaby or kiss him goodnight. 26 The jury subsequently returned a death
sentence.27
On appeal before the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Payne alleged that the
grandmother's testimony about the effect of the murders upon her grandson
constituted victim impact evidence, admitted in violation of the Supreme
Court's holding in Booth v. Maryland.2' The defendant also argued that
Booth similarly prohibited the prosecutor's closing remarks regarding the
victim. 29 The court rejected Payne's contentions and found that the grand-
mother's testimony, though technically irrelevant, did not create a constitu-
tionally unacceptable risk that the death penalty would be imposed in an
arbitrary manner. 30 The court further ruled that the prosecutor's closing
argument regarding Nicholas' physical and mental condition was directly
relevant to the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt.3
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2602. The defendant's girlfriend testified that she met Payne at church, that he
was a caring man, and that it was inconsistent with Payne's character to have committed the
crimes of which he was accused. A clinical psychologist also testified that the defendant was
borderline mentally retarded and that he was "the most polite prisoner he had ever met."
Finally, Payne's parents reported that their son had no previous convictions or history of
substance abuse, and that he was a "good son." Id. at 2601-03.




28. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 17 (Tenn. 1990), aff'd, Ill S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
29. Id. at 18. This case was originally tried more than one year before the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Gathers. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), however,
directs that Gathers be applied retroactively. The Tennessee Supreme Court considered this,
but found that the prosecutor's comments during his closing argument did not violate either
the Gathers or Booth decisions. Payne, 791 S.W.2d at 19.
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated:
When a person deliberately picks a butcher knife out of a kitchen drawer and pro-
ceeds to stab to death a twenty-eight year old mother, her two and one-half year old
daughter and her three and one-half year old son, in the same room, the physical and
[Vol. 41:469
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In arriving at its determination, the Tennessee Supreme Court referred to
Booth and Gathers and reasoned that it was an insult to society to allow the
defendant to present an unlimited number of witnesses to testify as to his
good character, while at the same time forbidding the sentencing authority
from considering similar evidence regarding the victim and the harm caused
to the victim and his remaining family.32 The court concluded that even if it
were to accept the argument that the victim impact evidence presented vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court, it would
still be admissible under the harmless error analysis.33
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Payne v. Tennes-
see34 to reconsider its holdings in Booth and Gathers.35 The majority, led by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled that evaluation of the harm resulting from the
act(s) of a defendant had long been a significant determinant in selecting the
appropriate punishment to fit a particular crime, and victim impact evidence
was merely another measure of informing the sentencing body about such
harm.3 6 Reasoning that Booth and Gathers had "unfairly weighted the
scales in a capital trial" by allowing the defendant unbridled authority to
mental condition of the boy he left for dead is surely relevant in determining his
"blameworthiness."
Id. at 19.
32. Id. The court rationalized:
It is an affront to the civilized members of the human race to say that at sentencing in
a capital case, a parade of witnesses may praise the background, character and good
deeds of [the] Defendant (as was done in this case), without limitation as to rele-
vancy, but nothing may be said that bears upon the character of, or the harm im-
posed, upon the victims.
Id.
33. Id. That is, based upon the overwhelming evidence presented during the guilt phase
of the trial, a death sentence was the only rational punishment available; therefore, the victim
impact evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Despite its implicit hostility
towards the Supreme Court's prior rulings, the Tennessee court's comments generally evi-
denced what was becoming a common means of evading the Booth and Gathers doctrine:
"harmless error" analysis. See infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text. This issue arose
during the oral arguments before the United States Supreme Court following the grant of
certiorari. At that time, Justice White asked Tennessee Attorney General Charles W. Burson
whether it was necessary for the Supreme Court to overrule Booth in order for the State to win.
59 U.S.L.W. 3762 (1991). Burson replied that while Booth was broad enough to cover the
victim impact evidence presented in this case, the Court could find that its admission was
harmless error. Id. This is significant, as the majority ultimately decided to overrule both
Booth and Gathers. Such a result suggests factors other than the merits of the case, including
public opinion and a change in the make up of the Court, may have influenced the Court's
decision to hear the case in the first instance. See infra text accompanying notes 183, 202, 207,
219.
34. 111 S. Ct. 1031 (1991).
35. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2604 (1991).
36. Id. at 2605.
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present mitigating evidence as to his own character,3 7 the majority held that
a state has a legitimate interest to counter such evidence by presenting rele-
vant victim impact evidence." To the extent Booth held to the contrary, it
was overruled. 9 The majority also reasoned that fairness to the prosecutor
required a rejection of the Gathers extension.'
In a strongly worded dissent, issued on the same day as his retirement,
Justice Marshall sharply criticized the majority for not adhering to prece-
dent and for treating lightly the doctrine of stare decisis. 4 1 "Power, not rea-
son, is the new currency of [the] Court's decisionmaking, ' 4 2 said Justice
Marshall, criticizing the majority for overruling Booth and Gathers simply
because the membership of the Court had changed.43 Justice Stevens also
issued a dissent, objecting to the majority's argument that victim impact evi-
dence is necessary to balance the scales in a capital sentencing proceeding."
He argued that the character of the victim is not on trial and should, there-
fore, be irrelevant.45
This Note traces the development of the use of victim impact information
during the sentencing phase of capital cases. This Note first examines the
pertinent Supreme Court rulings as to the types of information which may or
may not be considered by the sentencing authority during death penalty pro-
ceedings. Next, this Note discusses the relevance of Booth v. Maryland and
South Carolina v. Gathers in the context of victim impact evidence and
presents current legislation on the subject. This Note then analyzes the
Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee, its dramatic reversal of pre-
cedent, and its probable impact. This Note proposes that the Court's ruling
that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se rule prohibiting a sentencing
jury in a capital case from considering victim impact evidence, or precluding
a prosecutor from arguing such evidence, is both a reflection of a change in
the membership of the Court as well as an attempt to respond to public
37. Id. at 2607.
38. Id. at 2608-09.
39. Id. at 2609-11. The Booth decision also held that the admission of opinions of a vic-
tim's family regarding the crime itself, the defendant, and the sentence the defendant should
receive violated the Eighth Amendment. Booth's holding, that the use of opinions of a victim's
family is prohibited, was not ruled upon, as no such evidence was presented in Payne. Id. at
2611 n.2.
40. Id. at 2609-11.
41. See id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Stare decisis is defined as the "[p]olicy of
courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1406 (6th ed. 1990).
42. Payne, I 11 S. Ct. at 2619.
43. Id.




concern in the area of victims' rights, as codified in recent legislation. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that while adherence to the doctrine of stare deci-
sis is traditionally favored by courts, it is not an unyielding principle of law,
particularly within the purview of constitutional adjudication.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW IN THE REALM OF CAPITAL
SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS
A. Judicial Developments: Evidence Relating to the Character of the
Defendant and the Circumstances of the Crime
Prior to 1972, state capital punishment laws generally gave sentencing ju-
ries absolute and unbridled discretion to impose the death penalty.4 6 The
jury was not obligated to conform to any legal guidelines in arriving at its
decision, and it was not furnished with any particular information about the
defendant's character or background, aside from that necessary to support
his innocence.47 Determinations of the defendant's guilt and the appropriate
penalty were made as part of the same deliberations.48 Since that time, the
Supreme Court has crafted a body of law relating to the types of information
which may or may not be considered, or which must be considered, by a
sentencing body during capital punishment proceedings.
The 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia4 9 struck down statutes giving the
sentencing judge or jury untrammeled discretion to impose the death pen-
alty.5° Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, the Court in
Furman"' held that it could not be imposed pursuant to sentencing proce-
46. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982); JOHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEIS-
BERG, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 424 (1986).
47. KAPLAN, supra note 46, at 424.
48. Id. Under such statutes, the jury first ascertained whether the defendant was guilty
and thus eligible for the death penalty. Then, during the same deliberations, the jury deter-
mined whether to impose a life sentence or the death penalty. Id.
49. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
50. Id. at 239-40. The decision in Furman consisted of a brief disposition of the case,
followed by five individual concurring opinions by Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White,
and Marshall. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented.
Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall rejected the death penalty statutes because they objected to
capital punishment as cruel and unusual under any circumstances. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White
agreed that the statutes before the Court were invalid as applied, but left open the question of
whether capital punishment may ever be imposed. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-13 (White, J., concurring). The remaining four
Justices would have held the death penalty was not unconstitutional per se. Id. at 403-05
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414-18 (Powell, J., dis-
senting); id. at 465-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. Because five Justices wrote separate concurring opinions in Furman, the Court's hold-
ing is limited to the positions of those Justices who concurred on the narrowest grounds: Jus-
1992]
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dures which created a likelihood that such a penalty would be applied in an
arbitrary or capricious manner. 52 To ensure that discretion in the area of
capital sentencing be exercised in a limited, directed, and informed manner,
three Justices, in separate concurring opinions, intimated that there should
be specific jury findings as to the circumstances of the crime and the charac-
ter of the defendant.
5 3
In a series of companion cases in 1976, the Court established that all sen-
tencing discretion of judges and juries in capital cases should not be abro-
gated, but must be "directed and limited." 54 Recognizing that each
defendant is an unique individual," that the death penalty should be im-
posed consistently,5 6 and that the death penalty is, by its irrevocable nature,
markedly different from any other type of sentence," the Court reasoned
that a higher level of reliability and individualized consideration was re-
quired in capital sentencing cases.5" Specifically, in Woodson v. North Caro-
lina,5 9 the Court stated that the jury must be allowed to take into account all
of the pertinent aspects of the background and temperament of the convicted
defendant and of the circumstances surrounding the crime in order to assess
the defendant as a "uniquely individual human beingol."'  The Court found
that as a general proposition, the concerns expressed in Furman could be
tice Stewart and Justice White. See id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). The dissenting
Justices viewed this position with concern, noting "[tihe decisive grievance of the opinions...
is that the present system of discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to produce
evenhanded justice;.., the selection process has followed no rational pattern." Id. at 398-99
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311-313 (White, J., concurring). Jus-
tice White concluded that because "the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even
for the most atrocious crimes ... [there must be some] meaningful basis from distinguishing
the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313.
53. See id. at 256-57 & n.21 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring).
54. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.). Decided at the same time were Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Profflitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); and Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
55. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
56. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
57. A death sentence becomes irrevocable once carried out, while other sentences can be
modified by various methods, including parole, probation, and correction of mistaken convic-
tions. E.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.);
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
58. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
59. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
60. Id. at 304.
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met by a system which provided for a bifurcated sentencing proceeding6 I
and which set forth standards to guide a capital sentencing jury's delibera-
tions.62 Those standards include the requirement that certain aggravating
circumstances of the crime be proven by the prosecution in order for a jury
to impose a death sentence. 6a The Court placed no limitations, however,
upon the import accorded to relevant mitigating circumstances, which could
be weighed independently by the jury.6"
This stance was affirmed in 1978 in Lockett v. Ohio,65 in which the Court
ruled that a death penalty statute was cruel and unusual and, therefore, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, unless it allowed a sentencing authority
to give independent mitigating weight to those factors which could lead to
61. A bifurcated procedure is one in which the issue of the appropriate sentence to impose
is not considered until the determination of guilt has been reached. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-91
(plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
62. Id. at 195.
63. See id. at 197-98. Aggravating circumstances are defined as those circumstances
which surround the commission of a crime and increase its enormity or injurious consequences
or the defendant's guilt, but which are above and beyond the essential elements of the crime
itself. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 65 (6th ed. 1990).
The plurality approved the provisions of the Georgia statute in question, which permitted a
jury to impose a death sentence only after finding beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of ten
aggravating circumstances. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97. In addition to approving Georgia's
sentencing scheme, the joint opinions of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens also approved
the Florida scheme in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and the Texas scheme in Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Florida death penalty statute was similar to that in Gregg,
except that the trial judge, rather than a jury, was required to select from a prescribed list of
eight statutory aggravating circumstances and seven mitigating ones, and then weigh them in
order to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-53
(plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). By contrast, the Texas scheme at-
tempted to limit the category of defendants eligible for the death penalty by restricting capital
homicides to intentional and knowing murders committed in five particular situations. Jurek,
428 U.S. at 270 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). In upholding the
Texas scheme, the joint opinions observed:
While Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating circumstances the exist-
ence of which can justify the imposition of the death penalty as have Georgia and
Florida, its action in narrowing the categories of murders for which a death sentence
may ever be imposed serves much the same purpose.
Id.
64. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
Mitigating circumstances do not constitute a justification for the commission of the offense
charged, but may be defined as circumstances to be considered in fairness and mercy as extenu-
ating conditions of the crime, which reduce the defendant's degree of moral culpability.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990).
The Georgia statute at issue in Gregg allowed the sentencing judge to consider "any mitigat-
ing circumstances . . . which may be supported by the evidence." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975) (current version § 17-10-30(b) (Michie 1982)).
65. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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the imposition of a penalty less severe than death.66 Finally, in Gardner v.
Florida,67 a plurality of the Court ruled that a death sentence could not be
imposed upon a capital defendant based upon a presentence investigation
report containing information that the defendant had not had the opportu-
nity to explain or refute.68
As a result of these cases, the Court afforded a convicted defendant an
essentially unrestricted constitutional right to present mitigating evidence
that could be weighed by the sentencing authority.6 9 At the same time, the
Court restricted the prosecution to a codified list of aggravating circum-
stances.7 ° Beyond such limitations, however, the Court deferred to those
substantive factors considered by state legislatures to be relevant to the capi-
tal sentencing determination.7 '
B. The Victims' Rights Movement and the Legislative Response
In recent decades, Americans began to sense that the criminal justice sys-
tem had failed to grant victims a prominent role in the prosecution and dis-
position of criminal cases.72 Victims surviving the initial impact of violent
crimes often felt that they had to endure insensitivity and alienation at best,
and degradation and maltreatment at worst, at the hands of the criminal
66. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.). The Ohio statute, ruled by the plurality
to be unconstitutional, did not allow the sentencing body to consider such mitigating charac-
teristics as the defendant's age, character, prior record, role in the crime, and lack of specific
intent to kill. Id. at 605.
67. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
68. Id. at 358-62. A presentence investigation report outlines the results of an investiga-
tion into a convicted offender's background and is prepared to assist the sentencing authority
in passing sentence. It typically contains information regarding the offender's criminal act(s),
education, employment, social history, residence, medical history, home environment, finan-
cial and support resources, goals and ambitions, and previous criminal record, as well as a
recommendation as to disposition of the case. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1184 (6th ed.
1990).
69. See supra notes 64, 66 and accompanying text; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 114-15 (1982) (holding that a defendant in a capital trial must be allowed to introduce any
relevant mitigating evidence, which courts then weigh against evidence of all the aggravating
circumstances).
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
71. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1000-01 (1983). For example, some states
have required certain aggravating circumstances to be proven in order to impose a death sen-
tence, while others have limited the types of murders for which such a sentence may be im-
posed. See supra note 63.
72. Karen L. Kennard, Comment, The Victim's Veto: A Way to Increase Victim Impact on
Criminal Case Dispositions, 77 CAL. L. REV. 417, 417 (1989). This dissatisfaction with the
current state of criminal justice stems from victims' perceptions that the system devotes an
inordinate amount of its time and resources to protecting the rights of criminal defendants
while largely ignoring the plight of the victim. Id.
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justice system.73 The result has been the growth of a national "victims'
rights movement" that has achieved considerable success in spawning re-
forms to increase victim participation in criminal cases.74
One means of giving the victim an increased role in criminal trials has
been the requirement in some jurisdictions that victim impact statements be
included in certain presentence investigation reports, which a judge or jury
may then employ in arriving at an informed punishment decision during
sentencing proceedings." The use of a victim impact statement is designed
to increase victim participation at the post-trial stage of the criminal judicial
process-once a defendant's guilt has been determined. 6 Victim impact
statements utilized in the context of general criminal proceedings may in-
clude any or all of the following types of information: the circumstances
surrounding the criminal act and the means by which that act was carried
out; the victim's identity and personal characteristics; the impact of the
crime upon the victim and the victim's family; and/or the opinion of the
victim or the victim's family of the defendant and the form of punishment
that should be imposed.7 7
In 1982, President Ronald Reagan endorsed the Final Report of the Presi-
dent's Task Force on Victims of Crime. This report called for over one hun-
dred victim-oriented reforms aimed at state and federal legislatures and the
judiciary. 8 In particular, the report stressed that every victim should be
allowed to give some form of input during the sentencing of a criminal de-
fendant.79 In many states and in the federal system, comprehensive legisla-
tion was enacted encompassing a significant number of the reforms
73. Symposium, Victims' Rights, 11 PEPP. L. REV. xv, xv (1984) (Letter from Lois H.
Herrington, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Robert E. Palmer,
Editor-in-Chief, Pepperdine Law Review).
74. Kennard, supra note 72, at 417-18; see Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The
Victims'Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1984) (providing an
overview of the victims' rights movement).
75. Phillip A. Talbert, Comment, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Crim-
inal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200 (1988). For a discussion of the defini-
tional aspects of victim impact statements, see supra note 9. For a similar explanation
regarding presentence investigation reports, see supra note 68.
76. Kennard, supra note 72, at 418 n.l.
77. Talbert, supra note 75, at 203.
78. See PRESIDEr'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, Final Report (1982).
79. Id. at 77. The report advanced the following position: "Victims, no less than defend-
ants, are entitled to their day in court. Victims, no less than defendants, are entitled to have
their views considered. A judge cannot evaluate the seriousness of a defendant's conduct with-
out knowing how the crime has burdened the victim." Id. at 76-77. The Task Force reasoned
that when the court hears from the defendant's lawyer, his family and friends, his minister and
others, simple fairness dictates that the victim, as the one who has suffered the harm of the
defendant's crime, should be allowed a role during sentencing. Id. at 77.
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recommended by the President's Task Force,8" including requirements for
the use of victim impact statements in certain presentence reports as a means
of increasing victim participation in criminal cases."1 Specifically, Congress
passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act,82 which amended the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure to mandate the inclusion of such state-
ments in specified presentence reports. 3 Today, similar legislation exists in
forty-seven states and the District of Columbia.
84
In the context of capital murder cases, at least one state responded to
concerns that while a defendant was permitted to present unlimited mitigat-
ing evidence during sentencing, a victim, or the next of kin if the victim had
died, was not permitted to rebut with aggravating evidence.85 The Maryland
legislature enacted a statute which mandated the introduction of a victim
impact statement for the sentencing authority's consideration in any case in
80. In 1986, the Justice Department issued a follow-up report on the Task Force's recom-
mendations, which indicated that nearly seventy-five percent of the initial recommendations
had been implemented. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOUR
YEARS LATER: A REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME iii
(1986) (hereinafter U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE). On the federal level, Congress enacted the Victim
and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1512-15, 3146(a), 3579, 3580, 3663 (1988)), and the Victims of
Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 1401-1410, 98 Stat. 2170 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1988)). Similarly, as of 1985, thirty-one states
had enacted wide-ranging laws codifying a significant number of the reforms recommended by
the Task Force. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra, at 4.
8 1. See Paul S. Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time for a
Change, I 1 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 51 (1984). Of all the recent reform efforts, "none has been as
quickly accepted as the use of 'victim impact statements.'" Id.
82. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501,
1512-15, 3146(a), 3579, 3580, 3663 (1988)).
83. The Victim and Witness Protection Act amended Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(c)(2) to provide that the presentence report contain "information concerning any harm,
including financial, social, psychological, and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by any
victim of the offense." § 3, 96 Stat. at 1249; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(C). The rules were
amended again by The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 215(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2015. The relevant provision now provides that the presentence report
shall contain "verified information stated in a nonargumentative style containing an assess-
ment of the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, any individ-
ual against whom the offense has been committed." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D).
84. See Richard L. Slowinski, Note, South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibiting the Use of
Victim-Related Information in Capital Punishment Proceedings, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 215, 216
n. 10 (1990) (citing those jurisdictions which now require the inclusion of victim impact state-
ments in designated presentence reports).
85. See Susan A. Jump, Note, Booth v. Maryland: Admissibility of Victim Impact State-
ments During Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder Trials, 21 GA. L. REV. 1191, 1199 (1987).
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which the death penalty might be imposed. s6 The constitutionality of this
statute was tested in Booth v. Maryland.7
II. SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF VICTIM IMPACT INFORMATION
PRIOR To PAYNE
A. The Booth v. Maryland Doctrine: Forbidding the Use of Victim
Impact Statements During Capital Sentencing Proceedings
In Booth, the Court addressed the broad issue of whether the Constitution
permitted the consideration of victim impact evidence by a capital sentenc-
ing jury.88 John Booth was convicted of first degree murder after robbing
and killing an elderly couple in their home, 9 and chose to be sentenced by a
jury rather than by a judge.' ° In accordance with Maryland law, a victim
impact statement was prepared, providing the sentencing jury with two types
of information.9" First, it described the severe emotional impact of the
crimes upon the victims' family, and the personal characteristics of the vic-
86. In 1983 the Maryland General Assembly enacted the following provision: "In any
case in which the death penalty ... is requested ... a presentence investigation, including a
victim impact statement, shall be completed by the Division of Parole and Probation, and shall
be considered by the court or jury before whom the separate sentencing proceeding is con-
ducted .... MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(d) (1986). But see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 279, § 4B (West Supp. 1992) (excluding the use of victim impact evidence in capital
cases).
87. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
88. Id. at 501-02.
89. The defendant had been a neighbor of the victims Irvin Bronstein, 78, and his wife
Rose, 75. Booth had entered their home with another individual to steal money in order to
buy heroin. The victims were bound and gagged and stabbed repeatedly in the chest with a
butcher knife; they were found dead by their son several days later. Id. at 497-98. The case
involving both Booth and his accomplice was severed, and the accomplice was convicted of
first degree murder in a separate trial for his role in the slayings. Id. at 498 n. 1.
90. Id.; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(b) (1982).
91. The victim impact statement was part of a presentence report compiled by the Divi-
sion of Parole and Probation (DPP), containing information supplied by the victim or the
victim's family. The DPP prepared a victim impact statement pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE
art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986), directing that the statement shall:
(i) Identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense;
(iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense
along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as
a result of the offense;
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the
victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the
victim or the victim's family that the court requires.
Id. at § 4-609(c)(3); Booth, 482 U.S. at 498-99.
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tims; second, it set forth the family members' opinions and characterizations
of the crimes of the defendant.92 The trial court rejected Booth's contention
that the statement contained information that was irrelevant and unduly in-
flammatory, and that it should therefore be suppressed as violative of the
Eighth Amendment.93 Booth was subsequently sentenced to death.
94
Booth appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
conviction and sentence." The court found that the victim impact state-
ment provided the sentencing authority with the full measure of the harm
caused by the crime and did not inject an arbitrary factor into the sentencing
determination.96 The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that
the introduction of a victim impact statement during the sentencing phase of
a capital trial violated the Eighth Amendment. 97 The Court reasoned that
the information contained in a victim impact statement might not be related
to a defendant's blameworthiness, and could therefore cause the sentencing
body to consider factors which were irrelevant to the defendant's decision to
92. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498-500. The victim impact statement prepared in the case is set
forth in its entirety in an appendix following the Court's opinion. Id. at 509-15. The statement
contained the reports of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein's son, daughter, and granddaughter, among
others. The son said his parents were "amazing people" who were well-liked and had many
friends. He remarked about the continuing effect of the loss of his parents upon him, and the
difficulty he had in dealing with the means in which they had died. He felt that his parents
were not killed, but were "butchered like animals." Id. at 510-12. Likewise, the daughter
stated that she was constantly reminded of her parents and the viciousness of their murders.
She believed the murderers to be worse than animals and incapable of rehabilitation. Id. at
512-13. Finally, the granddaughter stated that whenever she thought of her grandparents she
could only dwell upon their death, and that their murders would haunt her for the rest of her
life. Id. at 513-14.
93. Id. at 500-01.
94. Id. at 501. The jury sentenced Booth to death for the murder of Mr. Bronstein and to
life imprisonment for the murder of Mrs. Bronstein. Id.
95. Booth v. State, 507 A.2d 1098, 1125 (Md. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled
by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
96. Id. at 1124. The Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that as a general principle, victim
impact statements served an important state interest in revealing all of the harm caused by the
crime. In Booth's case, the victim impact statement was "relatively straightforward" in its
descriptions of the effects of the murders upon the victims' family, and passed constitutional
scrutiny because it did not cause the jury to impose the death sentence "under the influence of
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor." Id.
97. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509. The Court was careful, however, to limit its holding to the
capital setting, noting that the death penalty is a "'punishment different from all other sanc-
tions.' " Id. at 509 n.12 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976)
(plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). "[C]onsiderations that inform the
sentencing decision may be different from those that might be relevant to other liability or
punishment determinations .... We imply no opinion as to the use of [victim impact] state-
ments in noncapital cases." Id.
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kill. 98 In so doing, the jury's attention would be diverted away from the
defendant's background and the circumstances of the crime.99 The Court
was particularly troubled by comments contained in the statement indicating
that the family members did not feel that the defendant could be rehabili-
tated.I °° For these reasons, the Court held that victim impact evidence
could not be admitted during sentencing at a capital trial because such evi-
dence created an impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision
would be made "in an arbitrary and capricious manner."' 0 1 In a caveat,
however, the Court stated that information contained in a victim impact
statement might be admissible if it "relate[d] directly to the circumstances of
the crime."' 2
The decision in Booth was based upon a narrow majority of five Justices,
and the four dissenting Justices spoke out strongly against the result. Writ-
ing for the dissent, Justice White argued that while there may have been
faults with the victim impact statement in the case, a per se rule prohibiting
their use in all capital sentencing proceedings was not necessary. 03 Justice
White recognized that because determinations of sentencing considerations
are "peculiarly questions of legislative policy," state legislatures should be
accorded more deference."° In addition, Justice White argued that "[t]here
is nothing aberrant in a juror's inclination to hold a murderer accountable
not only for his internal disposition in committing the crime but also for the
full extent of the harm he caused. ' "" Justice White also noted that victim
impact information was particularly relevant in capital cases because the
98. Id. at 504-05. Such factors include the emotion and grief of the family members or
the relative worth of the victim(s). Id.
99. Id. at 505.
100. Id. at 508. This statement was made by the victims' daughter. See supra note 92.
101. Id. at 502-03. The Court also expressed concern that if the prosecution was allowed
to introduce victim impact evidence during sentencing, the defense would have to be given the
opportunity for rebuttal. Such an event could create a "mini trial" on aspects of the victim,
diverting the jury's attention from its proper role of sentencing the defendant. Id. at 506-07.
102. Id. at 507 n. 10.
103. Id. at 518-19 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor
and Scalia joined Justice White's dissent. Id. at 515.
104. Id. Justice White noted that the Court had previously recognized that sentencing
considerations are "'peculiarly questions of legislative policy.'" Id. (quoting Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)). In addition, the Court must consider that "'[i]n a demo-
cratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently
the moral values of the people.'" Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
105. Id. at 516. For example, Justice White explained that someone who recklessly runs a
red light and unintentionally kills a bystander is more deserving of punishment than an indi-
vidual in the same circumstances who kills no one. Therefore, Justice White argued, if punish-
ment can be augmented in noncapital cases as a direct result of the harm caused, the same
standard should be equally applicable to capital cases. Id. at 516-17.
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state has a legitimate interest in countering the defendant's mitigating evi-
dence.' ° 6 In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the
majority's opinion, holding that the imposition of the death penalty should
be based solely upon the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt,
could not be reconciled with either societal practices or the opinions of the
Court.0 7 Justice Scalia also argued that the majority wrongly refused to
recognize "victims' rights."' 8
B. The South Carolina v. Gathers Extension: Prohibiting Prosecutorial
Comment Regarding Victim-Related Information
Two years after the Booth decision, the Court addressed the question of
whether the introduction of victim-related information by a prosecutor dur-
ing his closing argument to a sentencing jury considering the imposition of
the death penalty violated the rule set forth in Booth. " In South Carolina v.
Gathers, a jury convicted the defendant of murder for the killing of Richard
Haynes, a self-proclaimed preacher. "° Several items had been found scat-
tered around the murder site, including two bibles, rosary beads, prayer
cards, and a voter registration card."' During the closing argument of the
sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecutor read from one of the prayer
cards and inferred that the victim was a religious person." 2 He then pointed
to the voter registration card and suggested that the victim was a profoundly
106. Id. at 517. Justice White dismissed the majority's concerns over the creation of a
"mini trial" regarding the victim as fortuitous since no such event occurred at the trial level in
Booth. Id. at 518.
107. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined in his dissent by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor. Id. at 519.
108. Id. Justice Scalia noted that
[rlecent years have seen an outpouring of popular concern for what has come to be
known as 'victims' rights'-a phrase that describes.., the failure of courts of justice
to take into account in their sentencing decisions not only the factors mitigating the
defendant's moral guilt, but also the amount of harm he has caused to innocent mem-
bers of society.
Id.
109. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee,
Ill S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
110. 490 U.S. at 806. The evidence at trial showed that Demetrius Gathers and several
companions encountered Haynes, a stranger, in a park, and brutally assaulted him. He was
beaten and kicked repeatedly, a bottle was broken over his head, and he was ultimately stabbed
to death. Id. at 807.
111. Id. The items were admitted into evidence without comment or objection during both
the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. Id. at 807-08.
112. Id. at 808-10.
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good citizen because he voted. 3 The jury subsequently sentenced Gathers
to death." 1
4
On appeal before the South Carolina Supreme Court, Gathers challenged
the prosecutor's comments regarding the characteristics of the victim. The
court reversed the trial court, finding the comments regarding the victim's
character "unnecessary to an understanding of the circumstances of the
crime" and overly suggestive that Gathers "deserved a death sentence be-
cause the victim was a religious man and a registered voter."" 5 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari" 6 and affirmed, reasoning that the
prosecutor's comments were indistinguishable from those statements prohib-
ited in Booth." 7 The Court ruled that the comments related directly to the
victim's personal characteristics, and were thus inadmissible."' The Court
wanted to ensure that the jury made its sentencing decision based upon
Gathers' decision to kill and his blameworthiness, rather than upon the vic-
tim's personal characteristics.' '9 Nor could the content of the prayer cards
be considered circumstances of the crime within the purview of the Booth
exception, as no evidence existed to show the defendant had read them; the
fact that Haynes had been carrying them was seen as purely fortuitous.
20
As with Booth, Gathers involved a five-four split of the Court. The dis-
senting Justices in Gathers attacked the Booth decision and argued it should
be overturned. 121 Justice O'Connor, reiterating Justice White's dissent in
Booth, contended that peculiarized societal harm resulting from a specific
victim's death is a relevant sentencing consideration; she argued that a "rigid
Eighth Amendment rule which excludes all such considerations is not sup-
ported by history or societal consensus."' 12 2 Further, Justice O'Connor em-
phasized that just as it was necessary for the jury to consider Gathers' own
background in order to make a unique, individualized assessment, so should
113. Id.
114. Id. at 806-07.
115. State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). The
court held that the prosecutor had suggested that because the victim was a religious man and a
registered voter, Gathers was more deserving of the death penalty. The court found this to be
fundamentally unfair and in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
116. 488 U.S. 888 (1988). In asking the Court to overturn a decision made only a year
earlier, South Carolina may have been motivated by the change in the membership in the
Court. See supra note 19.
117. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810-11; see supra text accompanying notes 98-99, 102.
118. Id. at 810-12.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 811-12. The Court was careful to point out that while the items found at the
murder site were in and of themselves relevant evidence, their content was not relevant. Id.
121. Id. at 813-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 823-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 819-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the jury be able to consider information relevant to the victim's own unique
identity in order to assess the amount of harm caused and the appropriate
penalty. '23
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, called for Booth to be overturned despite the
traditional deference to the doctrine of stare decisis, noting that " '[w]hen
convinced of former error, th[e] Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent.' 124 He asserted, moreover, that Booth had no basis in the com-
mon law background of the Eighth Amendment, in societal tradition, or in
present societal consensus.' 25
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. State Supreme Court Cases Decided Since Gathers:
Controversy and Confusion
The application of the Booth doctrine and the Gathers extension has been
questioned by members of the United States Supreme Court and has defied
consistent application in state courts as a result of various judicial efforts to
ameliorate the per se rule.1 26 State courts, in general, have carved out three
means by which the rule of Booth and Gathers forbidding the use of victim
impact information can be avoided. Victim impact information may be used
when it directly relates to the circumstances of the crime, when it is brief and
unemotional, and when it constitutes "harmless error."'
127
The first means is set forth in a footnote in Booth itself. if the victim
impact evidence can be shown to "relate directly to the circumstances of the
crime,"' 12 that is, encompass factors about which the defendant was aware
123. Id. at 820-21.
124. Id. at 824-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665
(1944)).
125. Id. at 825.
126. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1991).
127. State courts have often attempted to prove several or all of these factors in order to
buttress their assertion that Booth and Gathers were not controlling. See, e.g., People v. Lewis,
786 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1990) (holding that evidence admitted during a capital sentencing proceed-
ing regarding the impact of a victim's murder upon his family was so brief and insignificant
that even though it was erroneously admitted, its inclusion was harmless error); People v.
Stankewitz, 793 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a prosecutor's closing comments during a
capital sentencing proceeding which noted that the murder victim was a young girl who would
never again speak with her family and friends and which asked the jury to consider how they
would feel if they were the victim's family, were brief and mild and thus harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1432 (1991). The Tennessee Supreme Court em-
ployed this method in its decision in State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1990), aff'd, Il l S.
Ct. 2597 (1991); see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
128. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 n.l0 (1987) (commenting that information sim-
ilar to that contained in victim impact statements may be admissible if directly related to the
circumstances of the crime), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, I I I S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
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during the commission of the crime, the Supreme Court intimated that it
may be admissible. 129 In Coleman v. State, 3 0 the Supreme Court of Indiana
was presented with the issue of whether the testimony of a family member
regarding the impact of the defendant's crimes upon a surviving victim vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Booth and Gathers.' The
defendant in Coleman was convicted of the murder of a young girl, the at-
tempted murder of her niece, and of child molestation. 132 During sentenc-
ing, the victim's grandmother testified that the victim's surviving niece
suffered nightmares following the crime. 13 3 The defendant was sentenced to
death by the judge upon recommendation of the jury. 1 34 On appeal, the
Indiana Supreme Court held that this testimony was straightforward and
readily anticipated by the defendant as a result of his heinous attack on the
two girls. 135 Because the testimony hardly encompassed " 'factors about
which the defendant was unaware,' ,,136 the admission of the testimony did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
13
Second, some courts distinguish the nature of the victim impact informa-
tion in Booth, which was very detailed, lengthy, and emotional, and hold
that if the victim impact information is comparatively brief and detached, it
may be admissible.' 3 ' In State v. Kills on Top,131 for example, the defendant
was convicted by jury of robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and deliberate
129. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text; see also People v. Thomas, 561 N.E.2d
57 (Ill. 1990) (holding that a capital sentencing hearing where prosecutorial evidence was ad-
mitted relating to the victims' families was fair since there was no likelihood that the jury's
focus had been shifted away from anything other than those factors of which the defendant
was aware during the crime's commission), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1092 (1991).
130. 558 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2912 (1991).
131. Id. at 1061.
132. Id. at 1060. Specifically, the defendant, Alton Coleman, approached two young girls
and enticed them to accompany him into a wooded area. The girls were ten-year-old A.H.
Turk and her seven-year-old niece, Tamika. The defendant cut off parts of the girls' clothing
and bound their hands, mouths, and legs. He proceeded to viciously kick at and stomp on
Tamika until her death, as A.H. looked on. Subsequently, A.H. was raped, strangled, and left
for dead. She was later found alive. Id.
133. Id. The grandmother of Tamika, who was also the mother of A.H., testified that A.H.
had become emotionally introverted and had frequent nightmares as a result of having been
sexually molested and having watched the defendant stomp Tamika to death. Id. at 1062.
134. Id. at 1060.
135. Id. at 1062.
136. Id. (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987)).
137. Id.
138. See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text; see also People v. Pitsonbarger, 568
N.E.2d 783 (Ill. 1990) (holding that testimony regarding the victim's date of birth by her
mother during the penalty phase of a capital trial, though improper, was isolated and incon-
spicuous, causing no likelihood that the jury's focus was shifted from proper considerations),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 204 (1991).
139. 793 P.2d 1273 (Mont. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2910 (1991).
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homicide." 4° During the penalty phase of the trial, the sentencing judge con-
sidered testimony from the murder victim's father about his son's character
and the impact of his son's killing upon the family.14 The defendant was
sentenced to death.142 On appeal before the Montana Supreme Court, the
court distinguished the victim impact evidence admitted in the case from
that presented in Booth.1 43 While the statements in Booth were extended
and passionate, the court in Kills on Top found that the father's testimony
was neither lengthy nor emotional.' 44 The admission of the statement,
therefore, created no risk that the sentence was imposed under "passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor" in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 145
Finally, other state courts apply "harmless error" analysis to cases involv-
ing the use of victim impact information. According to this method, courts
acknowledge that the use of victim impact information is improper, but be-
cause its use is isolated, inconspicuous, or unlikely to be highly prejudicial,
courts consider its inclusion during sentencing to be harmless. 146 This form
of analysis was used by the Supreme Court of Idaho in State v. Fain.'47 In
Fain, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, lewd and lascivi-
ous conduct with a minor, and first degree kidnapping.'14  During sentenc-
ing, a victim impact statement was presented containing information from
the murder victim's parents which described the impact of the loss of their
daughter upon the family and included their recommendations for a death
140. Id. at 1279. The evidence showed that the defendant, an American Indian, kidnapped
his victim, robbed him, and physically restrained him in an automobile for several hours. The
victim was extensively beaten and assaulted with a pipe, a tire iron, and a rock. Subsequently,
the victim was forced into the trunk of the car where he was confined for several hours. The
entire ordeal took over twelve hours. The victim ultimately died as a result of the torture and
confinement. Id. at 1280-82.
141. Id. at 1305. The father testified that he had been deprived of a son, that he and his
wife were undergoing counseling as a result, that his son was an honors graduate, and that his
son left behind a wife and two children. Id.
142. Id. at 1279.
143. Id. at 1305.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1305-06.
146. See infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text; see also State v. Paz, 798 P.2d I (Idaho
1990) (holding that the failure to exclude victim impact evidence regarding the victim's fa-
ther's opinion that the defendant should get the death penalty was harmless error during capi-
tal sentencing proceeding because the error did not influence the decision to impose the death
penalty), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2911 (1991).
147. 809 P.2d 1149 (Idaho 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3841 (1992).
148. Id. at 1149. In Fain, the defendant kidnapped a nine-year-old girl off the street and
took her to a remote area. There he began to molest her, and continued to do so after she fell
and hit her head on a rock. The defendant then carried the victim to a ditch and held her head
underwater until she died. Id. at 1150, 1153.
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sentence.149 The parents also provided similar information in their testi-
mony during the sentencing hearing.' 5 ° The defendant was sentenced to
death and appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho.' 5 ' On his third appeal,
the court found that the information provided during sentencing was clearly
of the kind prohibited by Booth, and therefore it was an error for the trial
court to admit it. 152 However, based upon the evidence and the nature of
the crime, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the victim impact informa-
tion, if it was considered at all, would not have played a decisive factor in the
decision to impose the death sentence. 153 It was, therefore, "harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt."'
' 54
B. Victim Impact Legislation and Capital Cases
In addition to the confusion and lack of consistency in state courts regard-
ing victim impact evidence, many concerned citizens and victims rights
groups, 155 as well as Congress, 156 began to respond to what they viewed as a
gross inequity that had been created as a result of the Booth and Gathers
decisions. One result has been the introduction of legislation in Congress
providing for the use of victim impact information during capital sentencing
proceedings.
In July 1991, the Senate passed the Violent Crime Control Act, 157 which
contains an amendment that, as adopted, requires courts in capital cases to
149. Id. at 1151. The victim impact statement reported that the family felt a great sense of
loss following the murder. Realizing that the defendant would appeal the conviction, the par-
ents said they were sorry their daughter could not appeal her death. They reported being
convinced of the defendant's guilt and recommended that the court impose a strict sentence.
Id.
150. Id. at 1151-52.
151. Following the original imposition of the death sentence, the defendant appealed to the
Supreme Court of Idaho. At that time, the case was remanded for further factual findings on
issues not related to the scope of this Note. On the next appeal, the conviction was affirmed
but the death sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing. The district court subse-
quently reimposed the death sentence, and the Supreme Court of Idaho was asked to examine
the reimposition of the death penalty. Id. at 1149.
152. Id. at 1152.
153. Id. There was no evidence that the victim impact statements diverted the trial court
from its duty to consider the uniqueness of the individual being sentenced rather than the
victim or her family. Id.
154. Id.
155. See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
157. S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Senate anti-crime bill would provide more
funds for law enforcement and prisons, expand the federal death penalty to nearly fifty crimes,
limit the number of habeas corpus appeals by death row inmates, stiffen penalties for crimes
involving drugs and firearms, establish a waiting period of five working days for the purchase
of handguns, and permit an exception to the exclusionary rule prohibiting the use of evidence
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consider a victim impact statement when deciding whether the imposition of
the death penalty in a particular case is justified.158 Courts would be re-
quired to consider the victim's character and the effect of the crime upon the
victim's family in federal capital sentencing hearings.' 59 The amendment
was designed to reflect the concerns of the American public that courts, in
dispensing their sentencing decisions in capital cases, have failed to consider
the harm caused to victims of violent crimes and the impact of such crimes
upon their families.'" ° In addition, in October 1991, the House approved
the Omnibus Crime Control Act, 16 1 which provides that in a hearing to de-
termine if a death sentence is justified, the government may present evidence
obtained by illegal search and seizure. Joan Biskupic, Senate Passed Crime Bill, 49 CONG. Q.
2102, 2102-05 (1991).
158. 137 CONG. REC. S8553 (daily ed. June 25, 1991). The Grassley/Nickles Amendment
No. 376 was proposed by Indiana Senator Charles E. Grassley, and endorsed by Oklahoma
Senator Don Nickles, both Republicans. Id. It was approved by the Senate as part of the
Violent Crime Control Act on June 25, 1991. Id. at D817. The pertinent section of the Act, as
adopted in its entirety on July 11, 1991, provides that in cases to determine whether a sentence
of death is justified, there shall be notice that the government seeks the death penalty, and in
its notice, the government must specify the determinants that support the imposition of the
death penalty. Those determinants:
[sihall include factors concerning the effect of the offense on the victim and the vic-
tim's family, and shall be based on a victim impact statement that identifies the vic-
tim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss suffered by the
victim and the victim's family, describes the necessary course of treatment for the
victim and the victim's family, and contains any other information related to the
impact of the offense on the victim and the victim's family that the court may
require.
137 CONG. REC. S9986-87 (daily ed. July 15, 1991) (emphasis added).
159. 137 CONG. REC. S8553 (daily ed. June 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley). Sena-
tor Grassley, speaking before the Senate on June 25, 1991, described the purpose of the amend-
ment as follows: "With this provision, we are going to . . . give a victim somewhat equal
consideration in the court with the criminal." Id. at S8554.
160. Id. Senator Grassley reasoned that the amount of harm an individual causes does
have a bearing upon his personal responsibility and is relevant in considering whether or not
the defendant should receive the death penalty. He remarked that "[tihe law-abiding citizens
of our Nation believe that in their sentencing decisions courts have failed to take into account
not only the factors aggravating a defendant's moral guilt but also the amount of harm caused
to innocent members of society." Id.
161. H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Like the Senate bill, the House legislation
would broaden the federal death penalty to about fifty crimes, restrict death row inmate ap-
peals, and allow prosecutors to use evidence obtained in violation of defendant's rights. Joan
Biskupic, House Panel Bucks Bush, GOP Over Anti-Crime Measure, 49 CONG. Q. 2787, 2787
(1991). However, the House bill also contains provisions that bolster the rights of defendants.
Specifically, the bill would permit convicted defendants to challenge their death sentences on
the basis that they are racially motivated. It would also ensure that confessions obtained from
defendants under coercion could not be admitted into evidence at trial. Id. The House Judici-
ary Committee crafted the anti-crime legislation, and approved it on September 26, 1991. Id.
It was passed by the full House on October 22, 1991. Status of Major Legislation, 102d Con-
gress, 49 CONG. Q. 3248, 3248 (1991).
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regarding the effect of the offense upon the victim and the victim's family. 62
That evidence may be presented in the form of oral testimony or through
victim impact statements.
163
There are two significant differences between the Senate and House bills,
however, as each relates to the introduction and use of victim impact evi-
dence. First, the Senate bill makes the introduction of a victim impact state-
ment mandatory during capital sentencing proceedings,' 1  whereas the
House Judiciary version merely permits the introduction of victim impact
evidence. 165 Second, the House version includes a provision that the victim
impact information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by
the dangers of prejudice to the defendant or will mislead or confuse the
jury. 166 The defendant is given the opportunity to rebut the evidence under
both versions. 167 The differences between the two versions, each as part of
larger crime bills, were reconciled by conference between the two chambers
in November 1991, with the House language prevailing.' 68
Such legislation has also been spurred by the efforts of various victims'
rights groups across the country following the Booth and Gathers decisions.
These groups have noted that the Booth prohibition of victim impact state-
ments is an extreme example of how the criminal justice system has lost
touch with the concerns of citizens by favoring convicted defendants, while
showing little or no regard for innocent victims. 169 Indeed, some have ex-
162. 137 CONG. REC. H7961 (daily ed. Oct 16, 1991). Specifically, the Omnibus Crime
Control Act provides that in a hearing to determine if a sentence of death is justified, there
shall be notice that the government seeks the death penalty, and in its notice the government
must specify the determinants that support the imposition of the death penalty. Those deter-
minants "may include factors concerning the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's
family." Id. (emphasis added). The Act continues that
[t]he information presented by the Government in support of factors concerning the
effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's family may include oral testimony,
a victim impact statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the nature and




164. See supra note 158.
165. See supra note 162.
166. 137 CONG. REC. H7961 (daily ed. Oct. 16. 1991). "[I]nformation may be excluded if
its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, or misleading the jury." Id.
167. The House and the Senate bills provide that "the defendant shall be permitted to rebut
any information received at the hearing." Id.; 137 CONG. REC. at S9987 (daily ed. July 15,
1991).
168. See infra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
169. 137 CONG. REC. S8554 (daily ed. June 25, 1991) (letter from John A. Collins, Eastern
Regional Director, Citizens for Law and Order, to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, United
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pressed the belief that Booth and Gathers were wrongly decided.17 ° This
notion is based in part upon studies indicating that the Supreme Court's
rulings have frustrated the laws in forty-eight states and the constitutions of
four more, and in part upon public surveys revealing that seventy percent of
Americans are of the opinion that victim impact information should be
available to the sentencing authority in capital cases.' 71  For these reasons,
many victims' rights groups expressed the hope that the Supreme Court
would recognize the inequity created by the previous Court decisions, and
remedy the injustice in Payne v. Tennessee.
172
IV. PAYNE V. TENNESSEE: RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF VICTIM
IMPACT INFORMATION DURING CAPITAL SENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS
In Payne v. Tennessee,173 the United States Supreme Court agreed to re-
consider the issue of whether, under the Eighth Amendment, victim impact
evidence and related prosecutorial comment may be admitted by the state
during a capital sentencing proceeding.' 74 The Court held that a state may
legitimately determine that evidence about the character of the victim and
States Senator). The director of the Citizens for Law and Order, a Springfield, Virginia-based
victims' rights organization, wrote a letter to Senator Grassley in support of his amendment.
A portion of the letter asserted that "the criminal justice system has been out of balance-
favoring the defendant and felon over the innocent victim. An outrageous example of this...
has been the prohibition against ... [victim] impact statement[s] at the sentencing phase of
capital cases." Id.
170. Id. Additionally, the Victims' Constitutional Amendment Network, a Fort Worth,
Texas, organization, argued that the Booth and Gathers decisions "demonstrate that equality
eludes the innocent victim of crime and that those who are convicted of a heinous murder are
protected by omitting pertinent information during the penalty phase of a capital murder
trial." Id. at S8555 (letter from Linda Barker-Lowrance, Chairperson, Victims' Constitutional
Amendment Network, to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, United States Senator).
171. Id. (letter from Mr. David Beatty, Director of Public Policy, National Victim Center,
to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, United States Senator). The cited statistics were con-
tained in a letter from a national victims' rights advocate, the National Victim Center. Fur-
ther, the letter characterized the Booth and Gathers decisions collectively as a "gross
miscarriage of justice," and noted that:
Convicted murderers are allowed to parade weeping family and friends, not to
mention an endless line of coaches, clergymen, psychologists and other witnesses in
front of the court to attest to the offender's good character and what a tragic loss his
demise would be to his family and community. All this in an attempt to solicit sym-
pathy and mercy from the jury. Yet the court is not allowed to hear one word about
the character of the innocent victim or the horrific consequences their death has had
on surviving family members.
Id.
172. Id. at S8554-55.
173. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
174. Id. at 2604.
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the effect of the crime upon his family is relevant to a sentencing jury's eval-
uation of whether to impose the death penalty; therefore, there is no per se
bar against the admission of such victim impact evidence. 7 ' According to
the Payne Court, Booth and Gathers were wrongly decided and were conse-
quently overruled.' 76
A. Majority Opinion: The Eighth Amendment Erects No Per Se Bar to
Victim Impact Evidence and Related Prosecutorial Comment
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion.' 77 The majority
began its analysis by discussing the numerous inconsistencies that were pres-
ent in the rule created by Booth and Gathers.""8 The Booth Court premised
its decision upon the notion that since victim impact evidence does not gen-
erally reflect upon the defendant's blameworthiness, it must be excluded dur-
ing a capital sentencing proceeding.' 79 The majority found fault with this
premise, noting that assessment of the harm resulting from a defendant's
criminal acts has always been relevant in determining the proper punishment
to fit a particular crime.180 The Court reasoned that victim impact evidence
is merely another measure of informing the sentencing body about such
harm.' Thus, if during the course of a bank robbery a defendant fires a
weapon and kills an individual, he may be sentenced to death; if the gun
misfires he may not. In each instance the defendant's moral responsibility is
equivalent, but his criminal responsibility for the resulting harm is vastly
different.'8 2 The majority also noted that in recent years Congress and a
vast number of states have enacted legislation similar to that which was
struck down in Booth, enabling the sentencing authorities to consider infor-
mation about the harm resulting from a defendant's criminal acts.'83
Next, the majority discussed the Booth interpretation of the Court's prior
requirement, as stated in Woodson v. North Carolina, that a defendant in a
175. Id. at 2609.
176. Id. at 2611.
177. Id. at 2597. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Souter. Id.
178. See id. at 2605-09.
179. Id. at 2605.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. The Court is making use of an example given by Justice Scalia in his dissent in
Booth. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 519 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by
Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
183. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606. The victim impact evidence presented in Payne was not
admitted pursuant to any such legislation in Tennessee. The majority noted, however, that the
admission of the evidence, and its effect during sentencing, was substantially the same as if the
evidence had been introduced in accord with a legislative mandate. Id.
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capital proceeding be treated as a "uniquely individual human being[]."' 4
According to the majority, Booth incorrectly interpreted this requirement to
mean that a capital defendant was entitled to receive individualized consid-
eration during sentencing "wholly apart from the crime which he had com-
mitted."' 85 In the view of the majority, this was a misreading of precedent
which had "unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial."' 8 6 In this case,
Payne presented the character testimony of his parents, his girlfriend, and a
clinical psychologist, none of which related directly to the circumstances of
the vicious crimes which Payne committed.' 87 The majority ruled that a
state has a legitimate interest in countering such evidence by presenting rele-
vant victim impact evidence.' 88 Therefore, the Court overruled Booth and
Gathers to the extent that they prevented capital sentencing authorities from
considering relevant victim impact evidence and related prosecutorial
argument. 189
The remainder of the majority's opinion focused on rebutting those argu-
ments made against victim impact evidence in Booth and Gathers, as well as
commenting on the doctrine of stare decisis. First, the Booth Court had
argued that if victim impact evidence were allowed during capital sentencing
proceedings, a "mini-trial" would in effect be needed in order for the defend-
184. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see supra text accompanying
notes 55-60.
185. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607. Booth posited that while the full range of consequences
foreseeable to the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime may be relevant in civil
and other criminal cases, it is not relevant in the special context of a capital sentencing pro-
ceeding. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504.
186. Payne, I I I S. Ct. at 2607. This comment reflects the concerns voiced by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; the federal and state legisla-
tures, see supra notes 82-86, 157-68 and accompanying text; and victims' rights movements
across the country, see supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text. It also demonstrates the
Court's underlying sense of fairness. See, e.g., Payne, Il1 S. Ct. at 2609 ("[T]here is nothing
unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind [the] harm at the same time as it considers the
mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant."); id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 122 (1934)) (" '[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The
concept of fairness must not be strained ......."). The proper interpretation of Woodson, in the
view of the majority, is that it was intended to describe a category of evidence which must be
received: evidence demonstrating the individuality of the defendant. Its purpose was not to
exclude a category of evidence entirely from consideration, such as that relating to victim
impact. See id. at 2607.
187. Id. at 2608-09.
188. Id. The majority reflected upon this paradox by noting that under Booth, a defendant
could introduce unlimited relevant mitigating evidence, but the State could not "offer[] 'a
glimpse of the life' which a defendant 'chose to extinguish' . . . or demonstrat[e] the loss to the
victim's family and to society ... " Id. at 2607 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397
(1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
189. See id. at 2609, 2611.
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ant to adequately rebut such evidence. 9 The majority in Payne rejected
this argument, finding the situation to be no different from others where a
party must address and respond to the evidence proffered.1 91 The Court in
Booth also had voiced concern that, by allowing victim impact evidence to be
admitted during sentencing, the Court would implicitly be saying that one
murderer may be more deserving of death than another, merely because of
his victim's relative value to the community. 192 Again, the Payne majority
was unpersuaded. In its view, victim impact evidence is designed to show
the uniqueness of a particular victim, regardless of what the sentencing au-
thority views as the societal loss incurred as a result of a victim's death. 93
The majority noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 194 provides a means for relief should the evidence introduced prejudice
the defendant and render the trial fundamentally unfair.' 95
Finally, the majority asserted that while adherence to precedent is tradi-
tionally favored because it provides predictability and encourages reliance
upon judicial doctrines, the Court has never felt bound to adhere to the doc-
trine of stare decisis when controlling decisions are impracticable or lack
sound thought or judgment, particularly in constitutional cases where " 'cor-
rection through legislative action is practically impossible.' ,196 In support
of these tenets, the majority pointed out that the Court has reversed thirty-
three constitutional decisions in whole or in part during its previous twenty
terms. 97 The majority justified its decision to overrule Booth and Gathers
by reasoning that those cases had been decided by scant majorities over vig-
190. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506-07 (1987).
191. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
192. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506 n.8.
193. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607. The majority noted that the victim in Gathers was "an out
of work, mentally handicapped individual, perhaps not, in the eyes of most, a significant con-
tributor to society, but nonetheless a murdered human being." Id.
194. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
195. Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 2608.
196. Id. at 2609-10 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). The majority ruled that "[sjtare decisis is not an inexorable com-
mand." Id. at 2609. In a constitutional case, legislatures have great difficulty in correcting
erroneous rulings. While the legislature can pass a law if the judiciary refuses to overrule a
prior decision in nonconstitutional cases, it must amend the Constitution to effect a change in
constitutional cases. This is because the United States Supreme Court is the final authority on
the constitutionality of a law under the United States Constitution. Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
146 (1803). Congress and the states are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Thus,
to overcome an adverse ruling, Congress or the states must either enact a new law pursuant to
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution or amend the Constitution. Burnet, 285 U.S. at
406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
197. Payne, 11l S. Ct. at 2610 n.1.
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orous dissents and had created uncertainty in the law rather than sound
judicial precedent. 198
B. Concurring Opinions: Booth and Gathers Were Wrongly Decided,
Unworkable, and Contradictory to Public Policy and Sentiment
Justice O'Connor, in a concurrence joined by Justices White and Ken-
nedy, posited that assuming victim impact evidence may be used by a state
during a capital sentencing proceeding, there is nothing in the Eighth
Amendment that calls upon states to treat such evidence in a manner dis-
tinct from other relevant evidence.' 99 Although the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual" punishments, 2" Justice
O'Connor reflected that there is nothing implicit in the Amendment, or in
the consciousness of society, which would prohibit sentencing juries from
considering the victim's character or the harm caused to the victim's fam-
ily. 20 1 In a reference to public policy, Justice O'Connor noted that most
states have enacted legislation permitting the consideration of victim impact
information,2 2 and that the Constitution does not preclude a state from at-
tempting to define the unique and special qualities of the deceased. 20 3 Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded by noting that Booth also addressed other
information not presented in Payne-opinions of the victim's family regard-
ing the defendant, the crime, and the proper sentence-information upon
which the Court did not pass judgment.2°
Justice Scalia mounted a defense in his concurrence, joined in part by Jus-
tices O'Connor and Kennedy, to Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion which
strongly advocated continued deference to the doctrine of stare decisis2 °
Justice Scalia noted that Justice Marshall himself had in previous cases
noted that the doctrine was not "'an imprisonment of reason,' ,206 and that
those concerned with public confidence in the justice system should remem-
ber that a decision contrary to the public's sense of justice, no matter how
grounded in the principles of law, would "'diminish respect for the courts
and for law itself.' ,207 In this regard, Justice Scalia viewed the Booth deci-
198. Id. at 2610-11.
199. Id. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
201. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 2612.
203. See id.
204. Id. at 2612-13.
205. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
206. Id. (quoting Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting)).
207. Id. (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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sion as an aberration, especially in light of the national victims' rights move-
ment that had spoken against the injustice of Booth. 20 ' According to Justice
Scalia, Justice Marshall's demand for special justification in order to set
aside prior Court precedents was incorrect in view of the significant harm
that society would continue to suffer were the Booth decision allowed to
stand. 2°
Justice Souter also delivered a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ken-
nedy, in which he agreed with the majority opinion that Booth and Gathers
should be overruled. 2' He declared that both cases were poorly reasoned
and that their continued application would lead to inconsistent and uncer-
tain results.21  Booth had issued a blanket prohibition against the considera-
tion of victim impact evidence, except in those situations where the evidence
was linked directly to the circumstances of the crime and was relevant to the
defendant's decision to kill.2 1 2 According to Justice Souter, however, mur-
der always has foreseeable consequences since every defendant knows that
the life he takes is unique and that the victim will leave behind some individ-
uals who will mourn his passing and suffer harm as a result.213 Therefore,
the fact that the defendant may not know specific details about his victim or
those who will survive him cannot obscure the fact that the victim, like the
defendant, is a unique individual. 2 4 Given a defendant's opportunity to
present unlimited mitigating evidence during sentencing, evidence of victim
impact should be allowed to balance the process.21 5 Justice Souter also ar-
gued that there were serious problems involved in applying the Booth stan-
dard: despite the Booth prohibition, victim impact evidence still could be
introduced during the guilt phase of a trial, in which case the jury would
have the benefit of its knowledge during sentencing.21 6 Thus, in order to
208. Id.
209. See id. at 2613-14.
210. Id. at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring).
211. See id. at 2614-19.
212. Id. at 2615; see Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987), overruled by Payne,
111 S. Ct. 2597.
213. Payne, II1 S. Ct. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter reasoned:
Just as defendants know that they are not faceless human ciphers, they know that
their victims are not valueless fungibles, and just as defendants appreciate the web of
relationships and dependencies in which they live, they know that their victims are
not human islands, but individuals with parents or children, spouses or friends or
dependents.
Id.
214. Id. at 2616.
215. Id.
216. Id. Justice Souter gave the following example to illustrate the problems associated
with Booth. Suppose a minister dressed in layperson's clothes was robbed and killed on a street
by a stranger. Unbeknownst to the defendant, the minister's wife and child witnessed the
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maintain the goals of Booth, separate juries would be required for the guilt
and penalty phases of trial, which, according to Justice Souter, would clearly
be unworkable.217
C. Dissenting Voices: The Consequences of Abandoning the Doctrine of
Stare Decisis and the Role of Public Opinion
Justice Marshall, in his final dissent after the announcement of his retire-
ment,21 8 sharply criticized the majority's decision to overrule Booth and
Gathers. Joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice Marshall posited what was, in
his view, one of the true reasons the Court agreed to revisit the issue of
victim impact evidence: the change in the makeup of the Court.2 1 9 Justice
Marshall noted that neither the legal justification underlying the Booth doc-
trine and the Gathers extension, nor the evidential foundation supporting
them, had experienced any alteration in the four years since Booth was de-
cided. 22 0 Justice Marshall also took strong exception to the majority's ap-
parent dismissal of the doctrine of stare decisis in overruling two Supreme
Court precedents, which were only two and four years old respectively. 22 '
The implication that cases dealing with constitutional liberties might now be
open to reconsideration and possibly reversal, was, in Justice Marshall's
words, "staggering. 222
killing from a car. Under Booth, such information would not be admissible during sentencing
since it was unknown to the defendant and therefore irrelevant to his decision to kill. This
information, however, would be admitted during the guilt phase of the trial, and it is likely the
wife and child would deliver emotional testimony. In addition, the fact that the victim was a
minister would also be difficult to keep from the factfinder. The irony of Booth is that these
facts will remain in the minds of jurors, even if they cannot be admitted again during the
sentencing phase of the trial. Id. at 2616-17.
217. Id. at 2617.
218. Ruth Marcus, Marshall Retires from Divided Supreme Court,- 6-3 Vote Reverses Prece-
dents as Justices End Term, WASH. POST, June 28, 1991, at Al.
219. See Payne, II1 S. Ct. at 2622 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted "[it
takes little real detective work to discern what has changed since this Court decided Booth and
Gathers: this Court's own personnel." Id.
220. Id. at 2619. The only notable difference, in Justice Marshall's view, was a change in
the Court's personnel. According to Justice Marshall, "[plower, not reason, is the new cur-
rency of this Court's decisionmaking." Id.
221. See id.
222. Id. Justice Marshall listed seventeen cases, all decided by a five-Justice majority, as
being on the "endangered precedents" list. The list included a 1990 case upholding the author-
ity of the federal government to set aside broadcast licenses for applicants; a 1987 affirmative
action ruling stating that promotions may be used as a remedy for racial discrimination in
government hiring; a 1986 case reaffirming the right to abortion; a 1986 decision prohibiting
the execution of the insane; and a 1985 decision barring federal government financial aid to
parochial schools. See id. at 2623 & n.2.
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In contrast to the majority's characterization of stare decisis, Justice Mar-
shall argued that historically the Court demanded an "extraordinary show-
ing" in order to reverse its precedents. 223 Further, stare decisis is important
because fidelity to precedent buttresses the Court's authority and fosters its
ability to command compliance with its holdings.224 Justice Marshall ar-
gued that by side-stepping the doctrine, lower courts and state actors are
invited to renew those policies deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in the hope of obtaining a Supreme Court reversal.225 Indeed, Justice
Marshall pointed out that the Tennessee Supreme Court did just that by
declining to follow the Court's precedents because of its open contempt for
the Booth and Gathers decisions.226 Justice Marshall concluded by stating
that the majority's ruling would open the gates of precedent to attack, plac-
ing at substantial risk the Court's role as a "protector of the powerless., 227
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justice Blackmun, argued that even
if Booth and.Gathers had never been decided, the majority's decision would
represent a dramatic departure from prior Court rulings. 228 Those rulings
required that any decision to impose a death sentence must be predicated
exclusively upon that evidence which informs the sentencing authority of the
nature of the crime and the character of the defendant.229 Victim impact
evidence which, according to Justice Stevens, serves no purpose other than
to inflame the emotions of the jurors, fails to meet the aforementioned crite-
ria and therefore should not be admissible.23° Justice Stevens also asserted
that while the majority's argument to balance the scales during sentencing
had strong political appeal, such evidence is irrelevant.231 Justice Stevens
concluded by acknowledging that given the current heightened level of crime
in the United States, and the political power wielded by victims' rights
223. Id. at 2621.
224. See id. at 2623-24.
225. Id. at 2624.
226. Id; see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
227. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
228. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. See id. at 2625-26.
230. Id. at 2626.
231. Id. at 2627. In other words, the victim is not the one who is on trial, the defendant is;
therefore, the victim's character is irrelevant to the sentencing determination. See id. Justice
Stevens argued that evidence relating to the victim would serve no purpose other than to iden-
tify some victims as more worthy of protection than others. Id. at 2631. Justice Stevens,
however, found it entirely consistent with Booth and Gathers to mandate the death penalty for
certain classes of victims, such as the President, a Supreme Court Justice or a policeman on
active duty. Id. at 2628 n.2. Justice Stevens explained the apparent contradiction by noting
that the killing of these classes of victims is proscribed by statute, and therefore all defendants
convicted of such crimes would have been able to foresee the consequences and be assured of
equal treatment under the law. Id.
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groups across the country, the decision in Payne will be received enthusiasti-
cally by a majority of Americans.232 Justice Stevens warned, however, that
the great misfortune of the Payne decision is that public opinion influenced
not only the Court's initial determination to hear the case, but also its reso-
lution of the constitutional question involved.233 Further, the possibility of
affirming the case using the Tennessee Supreme Court's "harmless error"
approach was not even considered.23 4
V. THE IMPACT OF PAYNE V. TENNESSEE AND POSSIBLE
RAMIFICATIONS
A. The Admission of Victim Impact Evidence in Judicial Determinations
Following Payne: Some Qualifications
The majority decision, in overruling Booth and Gathers, holds that the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution erects no per se bar to the admission
of evidence or prosecutorial argument relating to the character of the victim
or the impact of the crime upon a victim's family during a capital sentencing
proceeding.2 35 The practical result of this holding is that if a state chooses
to permit the admission of victim impact evidence, there is no constitutional
barrier to its inclusion during sentencing. However, this decision does not
hold that victim impact evidence should be admitted, or even that it must be
admitted. 236 The propriety of introducing victim impact evidence during
capital sentencing proceedings remains subject to the procedural law of the
jurisdiction, which may choose not to allow such information.23 7 Such a
result places a strong burden upon state legislatures, as well as Congress, to
statutorily proscribe the extent to which victim impact information may be
utilized during capital sentencing hearings.
The Court in Payne was careful to impose some limitations upon its hold-
ing. In addition to ruling that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to
232. Id. at 2631.
233. Id.
234. Id. Justice Stevens noted that much of the victim impact evidence presented in Payne
had been properly introduced during the guilt phase of the trial. Since the crime committed
was so disturbing, it is likely the impact of the evidence would have remained on the minds of
jurors during sentencing, regardless of whether it was reintroduced. For this reason, the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court's conclusion that the error was harmless may have been justified. Id. at
2630. Compare supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (arguing that this justification is
what makes Booth unworkable).
235. See id. at 2609.
236. Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
237. "[T]he primary responsibility for defining crimes against state law [and] fixing punish-
ments for the commission of these crimes . . . rests with the States." Id. at 2607 (majority




the admission of victim impact evidence, the Court also determined that if
victim impact evidence is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fun-
damentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
may provide a relief mechanism to prohibit its inclusion.23 In addition, the
Court did not rule on Booth's prohibition of the use of victim evidence relat-
ing to family members' opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the
sentence he should receive.239 Since no such evidence was presented in
Payne, the Court refrained from overruling that segment of the Booth opin-
ion. 24' Thus, the ability to introduce victim impact information during capi-
tal sentencing determinations is not without limits.
B. The Legislative Response
Although it is still relatively early to gauge state legislative response to the
Payne decision,241 Congress, as previously noted, has begun to craft legisla-
tion which addresses the use of victim impact evidence during capital sen-
tencing proceedings.242 Following the passage of the two divergent anti-
crime bills in the Senate and the House, each containing provisions dealing
with victim impact information, a congressional conference was held in late
1991 to reconcile the bills.243 The resulting conference report adopted the
victim impact language from the House bill.2'  While both versions are sub-
stantially similar in terms of the type of victim impact information that may
be admitted, the House version provides only for voluntary inclusion of vic-
238. See supra notes 174-75, 194-95 and accompanying text; see, e.g., McMillian v. State,
No. 1 Div. 864, 1991 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 1443, at *57 (Sept. 20, 1991).
239. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., State v. Layers, 814 P.2d 333, 337 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 343 (1991).
241. At least six states have introduced legislation regarding the use of victim impact infor-
mation in capital sentencing proceedings since the decision in Payne v. Tennessee was handed
down by the Court: California, Florida, Louisiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washington.
Search of LEXIS, Legis library, Sttrck file (Aug. 22, 1992).
242. See discussion supra part III.B.
243. The Conference Report on the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1991, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 405, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), was submitted to the full Con-
gress on November 26, 1991. 137 CONG. REc. H 11,686 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991). It called for
the application of the death penalty to greater than fifty federal crimes, the restriction of death
row inmate appeals to federal courts, the use of evidence seized under faulty warrants so long
as the police acted in "good faith," a delay of five working days in order to buy a handgun, and
the authorization of three billion dollars for law enforcement. Helen Dewar & Guy Gugliotta,
Congressional Scorecard, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1991, at A29.
244. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 405, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1991) (joint explanatory state-
ment of conference committee); see id. at 6 and supra note 162 (providing specific language).
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tim impact statements during sentencing;245 the Senate version is
mandatory.
2 46
Since the Payne decision allows a jurisdiction to choose whether or not to
admit such evidence,247 the adopted House language would closely follow
Payne, but it would not strengthen it to the degree that the Senate version
would have. Perhaps this reason, in conjunction with the belief that the
conference bill would weaken the criminal justice system rather than
strengthen it, led President Bush to threaten to veto the crime bill.248 While
the House narrowly approved the conference agreement, Democrats in the
Senate were unable to muster enough votes to avoid a filibuster by Republi-
cans, and the bill was shelved.249 As of August 1992, the bill continued to
languish in the Senate, although lawmakers from both parties had met with
the Justice Department with the goal of reaching a compromise to break the
impasse.25° Such a compromise could further alter the "victim impact"
language.
C. The Future of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
While the Court's view on the admissibility of victim impact statements
during capital sentencing proceedings is clear, its impact upon the doctrine
of stare decisis is not immediately evident. According to Justice Marshall,
the majority in Payne trivializes the doctrine by limiting its applicability to
those cases involving property and contract rights.25' The majority ruling,
however, was based upon the principle that adherence to precedent is neces-
sary in cases involving property and contract rights because of the strong
reliance interests involved.252 According to the majority, the opposite is true
in constitutional cases where corrective action through legislation is near to
impossible.25 a In overruling Booth and Gathers, the majority explained that
245. See supra note 162.
246. See supra note 158.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 236-38.
248. John E. Yang, Bush Vows He Will Veto Crime Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at
Al.
249. Helen Dewar, Senate Crime Bill Shelved After Republican Filibuster, WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 1992, at A8.
250. Guy Gugliotta, Crime Bill a Hostage of Politics, WASH. POST, August 5, 1992, at A14.
251. Payne v. Tennessee, 11l S. Ct. 2597, 2623 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 2610 (majority opinion); see Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States
v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 443, 458 (1852).
253. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2610; see supra note 196 (discussing reasons why legislative cor-
rection is difficult in constitutional cases). The constitutional issue faced by the Court in Payne
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the opinions were narrow majority decisions involving individual rights, de-
cided over staunchly critical dissents.254 In retrospect, it thus appears the
Court may be signaling a willingness to revisit those cases involving constitu-
tional or individual rights where the decisions resulted from a narrow major-
ity split of the Court. In Justice Marshall's view, "[t]he implications of this
radical new exception to the doctrine of stare decisis are staggering.
255
In actuality, the Court's treatment of the doctrine of stare decisis is not
such a novel approach. The principle of strict adherence to precedent has
been consistently maligned thoughout this century and is currently disfa-
vored in the context of constitutional adjudication. 256 Indeed, some com-
mentators have gone so far as to suggest abandoning the application of the
doctrine altogether in the realm of constitutional law.25 7 The Supreme
Court itself has long recognized that stare decisis plays a limited role in cases
involving constitutional questions,25 and its role in those situations where
capital punishment is at issue is even more suspect.2 59 While stare decisis
traditionally promotes stability, uniformity, and predictability in the law, in
was whether the Eighth Amendment imposed a blanket prohibition on the use of victim im-
pact evidence during a capital sentencing proceeding. Id.
254. Id. at 2610-11.
255. Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
256. Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 741 & n.108 (1988).
257. Id. at 743.
258. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 94 (1936); Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). A celebrated
lecture given by Justice William 0. Douglas noted that stare decisis should mean very little in
constitutional cases. William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949). Jus-
tice Douglas explained: "[a] judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions
to revere past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all else that
it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predeces-
sors may have put on it." Id. at 736. The Supreme Court has given the doctrine of stare
decisis consistently less deference in the constitutional sphere. For example, the Court over-
ruled thirty cases from 1937 to 1949. Id. at 743. Twenty-one of those reversals were on consti-
tutional grounds. Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts of the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional
Law, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 467 (1980). From 1960 to 1980 the Court overruled constitutional
cases forty-seven times. Id. During the past twenty terms, the Court overruled, in whole or in
part, thirty-three constitutional decisions. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2610 & n. 1.
259. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 718-19 (2d Cir.
1955) (arguing that while stare decisis may perpetuate an unjust rule upon which individuals
have relied in conducting their business activities, the doctrine should not govern when a per-
son's life is involved); People v. Aranda, 407 P.2d 265, 272 (Cal. 1965) (arguing that courts
should not adhere to precedents in criminal cases where a person's life is at stake); People v.
Lewis, 430 N.E.2d 1346, 1371 (Ill. 1981) (Simon, J., dissenting) (asserting that capital punish-
ment is an area unsuited for strict adherence to stare decisis because of the nature of the death
penalty and the stakes involved), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982); Margaret S. Hewing,
Note, Stare Decisis and the Illinois Death Penalty, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 177, 196 (proposing
that the doctrine of stare decisis should have a diminished role in capital cases).
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capital and constitutional cases the greater need for flexibility and preven-
tion of error outweigh these considerations. 2" Finally, the Supreme Court
has suggested that stare decisis encompasses the importance of considering
constitutional and capital punishment cases on their merits, examining all of
the policy questions involved, rather than acting with blind deference to
precedent.
2 61
Former Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., commented on the doctrine of
stare decisis in a manner which is particularly enlightening in view of the
decision in Payne. Justice Brennan noted that the Supreme Court plays a
unique role in its interpretation of the Constitution, and that role demands
flexibility.2 62 In parsing the text of the Constitution, Justice Brennan be-
lieved that the Court must consider society's views to the extent that "when
a justice perceives an interpretation of the text to have departed so far from
its essential meaning, that justice is bound, by a larger constitutional duty to
the community, to expose the departure and point toward a different
path."'2 63  Exposing the Court's departure from the true meaning of the
Eighth Amendment is what the majority in Payne actually accomplished. 2
By allowing states to admit victim impact evidence during capital sentencing
proceedings, the Court reflected the concerns and perceptions of society, as
well as the Court's own constitutional interpretations.2 65 This result is en-
tirely consistent with the Court's prior determination of the role of stare
decisis in constitutional cases.266
260. See Hewing, supra note 259, at 196-97. Because of the fundamental rights at issue in
constitutional cases, and the threat of the deprivation of a life in capital cases, the need to
correct error in those cases rather than to perpetuate it under stare decisis is of particular
concern. Id.
261. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (stating that "stare decisis is a
principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision").
262. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 427, 437 (1986).
263. Id.
264. The majority in Payne rejected the Court's prior decisions in Booth and Gathers that
the Eighth Amendment erected a per se bar against the admission of victim impact evidence
during capital sentencing proceedings. See discussion supra part IV.A.
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (arguing that stare decisis "is not 'an imprisonment of reason' ") (quoting
United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 249 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting));
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972) (explaining that adherence to precedent which
contradicts the public's sense of justice may diminish respect for the law and the judicial pro-
cess); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (noting that the Court has never been
constrained to follow poorly reasoned or unworkable precedent); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 38, 94 (1936) (noting the limited role stare decisis plays in constitu-
tional cases); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (noting that stare decisis should play a limited role in constitutional cases because




In Payne v. Tennessee, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered its
decisions in Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers, decided in
1987 and 1989, respectively. Those opinions had announced a blanket, per
se rule prohibiting the use of victim impact evidence, or prosecutorial com-
ment reflecting such evidence, during capital sentencing proceedings. As a
result of a change in the personnel of the Court, the Court's desire to reflect
the concerns of citizens which had become manifested in national and state
legislation and the victims' rights movement, and the majority's belief that
Booth and Gathers had been wrongly decided, the Payne Court overruled
Booth and Gathers. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not
forbid the admission of evidence regarding a victim's personal characteris-
tics, or the impact of the crime upon the victim's family, during the penalty
phase of capital trials. States are now free to introduce such evidence.
Consideration of victim impact information at sentencing adds balance to
the current system and is in accord with the tenet that stare decisis plays a
limited role in deciding fundamental constitutional issues. The decision in
Payne v. Tennessee reflects the view that fairness can be accomplished in
capital trials only when information regarding the victim, as well as the de-
fendant, is considered. In the words of former Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo:
"Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept
of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to
keep the balance true.
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267. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934), quoted in Payne v. Tennessee, 111
S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
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